Income smoothing practices and empirical testing using discretionary accounting changes by Trisanti, Theresia
Journal of Economics, Business, and Accountancy Ventura Vol. 17, No. 1, April 2014, pages 117 – 126 
117 
 
Income smoothing practices and empirical testing using discretionary 
accounting changes 
Theresia Trisanti1 
 
1 Sekolah Tinggi Ilmu Ekonomi YKPN, Yogyakarta, Seturan Street 34-36, Yogyakarta, 55281, DIY, Indonesia 
 
 
 A B S T R A C T  
Financial statements of listed firms are analyzed by financial analysts and investors.
In this case, the firms may suffer from stock price declines if they do not meet market
expectations. Listed firms may not only have incentives to avoid income declines and 
losses, they also have incentives to meet or beat market expectations in order to pre-
vent declines in stock price. Income smoothing (IS) is the intentional dampening of
fluctuations about some levels of income that is considered to be normal for a firm. IS 
manipulation has a clear objective, which is to produce a steadily growing stream of
income. In this study, income-smoothing practices of Indonesian listed companies are 
detected through empirical tests using discretionary accounting changes (DAC) as IS 
instrument. Sample firms are classified as smoothers and non-smoothers using income 
smoothing behavior index. Results show that possible motivations of DAC transac-
tions are income smoothing. The two independent variables such as external audit 
quality institutional ownership have significant influence towards IS practices. But,
the type of industry has no significant relationship towards IS Practices.  
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 A B S T R A K  
Laporan keuangan perusahaan yang terdaftar di bursa efek biasanya akan dianalisis 
oleh para analis keuangan dan investor. Dalam hal ini, perusahaan mungkin akan
mengalami penurunan harga saham yang diperdagangkan jika laporan keuangan
tidak memenuhi ekspektasi pasar. Perusahaan memiliki insentif untuk menghindari
penurunan laba dan memenuhi ekspektasi pasar terhadap kinerja perusahaan, semua
dilakukan untuk mencegah penurunan harga saham. Perataan laba adalah tindakan
yang digunakan manajemen untuk mengurangi fluktuasi laba yang dilaporkan agar
sesuai dengan target yang diinginkan perusahaan. Dalam studi ini, praktik perataan 
laba perusahaan yang terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia akan dianalisis menggunakan 
instrumen perataan laba yaitu perubahan akuntansi diskresioner (DAC). Hasil peneli-
tian menunjukkan bahwa motivasi transaksi DAC adalah perataan laba. Dua variabel 
independen seperti kualitas audit eksternal dan kepemilikan institusional berpengaruh
signifikan terhadap praktik perataan laba. Namun, variabel tipe industri tidak 
memiliki hubungan signifikan terhadap praktik perataan laba.  
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
As suggested by the FASB’s Statement of Financial 
Accounting Concepts No.1, the main objective of 
financial statements is to provide information that 
is useful to present for potential investors and oth-
ers in making rational investment, credit and simi-
lar decisions. The usefulness of financial and other 
statements is affected by the quality of reporting. 
The quality of financial reports should be relevant 
(timely) and reliable (verifiable and unbiased). This 
means financial statements are free of material mis-
statements due to errors and fraud. The result of 
this high quality information is that it is useful in 
analyzing the past and predicting the future. For 
capital markets to function efficiently and effec-
tively, participants (including investors and credi-
tors) must have confidence in the financial report-
ing process. Financial statement fraud, as we’ve all 
seen recently, is a serious threat to this confidence 
(Jonas & Blanche 2000; Schipper & Vincent 2003). 
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A manager as a preparer of financial report 
should be able to communicate the information and 
safeguard its relevance and reliability. When man-
ager’s incentive is based on their companies’ finan-
cial performance, it may be in their self-interest to 
give the appearance of better performance through 
income smoothing practices. In many companies, 
managers are compensated both directly (in terms 
of salary and bonus) and indirectly (in terms of 
prestige, future promotions, and job security) de-
pending on a firm’s income performance relative to 
some pre-established benchmark. This combination 
of management’s discretion over reported income 
and the effect these incomes have on their compen-
sation leads to a potential agency problem (Habib 
2005; Mansor & Achmad 2009). 
Beyond the management compensation prob-
lem, income smoothing practices may affect inves-
tors by giving them false information. Capital 
markets use financial information to set security 
prices. Investors use financial information to de-
cide whether to buy, sell, or hold securities. Mar-
ket efficiency is based upon the information flow 
to capital markets. When the information is incor-
rect, it may not be possible for the markets to 
value securities correctly. To the extent that in-
come smoothing practices obscures real perform-
ance and lessens the ability of shareholders to 
make informed decisions, we can view income 
smoothing practices as an agency cost. As a result, 
financial reporting quality has been the subject of 
serious criticism in recent years (Bauwhede & 
Willekens 2003; Shuli 2011). 
Income smoothing (IS) is defined as the inten-
tional dampening of fluctuations about some level 
of income that is currently considered to be nor-
mal for a firm (Beidleman 1973). The IS practices 
will not only result on non real company financial 
reports but, in the long term, it could also lead to 
an extreme and complex manipulations to meet 
the increasing internal sales target and external 
stakeholders’ expectation. Although it is highly 
risky, existing literature has documented evi-
dences that company managers actively engage in 
IS practices. Furthermore, in comparison to their 
developed-country counterparts, IS practices in 
developing and emerging economies are higher 
(Habib 2005; Ismail et al. 2009). The multiple in-
centives of income smoothing practices might also 
have motivated Indonesian firms to manipulate 
their financial statements to have smoother in-
come figures. Since Indonesia developing coun-
tries and has an emerging capital market (i.e. 
highly-concentrated ownership, developing legal 
infrastructure), therefore it is important to exam-
ine the IS practices and also to identify factors 
affect the IS practice in Indonesian public listed 
company. Therefore the main objectives of this 
study are to verify the effect of IS instrument such 
as: discretionary accounting changes (DAC) to the 
IS practice, and to investigate the effect of compa-
nies’ specific characteristic attributes (the institu-
tional ownerships, type of industry and external 
audit quality) on the IS practices. 
 
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HY-
POTHESIS 
As describe previously, IS Practice is defined as the 
intentional dampening of fluctuations about some 
level of income that is currently considered to be 
normal for a firm, In other words, income smooth-
ing is the process of manipulating the time profile 
of income or income reports to make the reported 
income stream less variable, while not increasing 
reported income over the long run. Therefore, in-
come smoothing practice has a clear objective, 
which is to produce a steadily growing stream of 
profits. Research in income smoothing practices has 
shown that there are plenty of tools available for 
income smoothing practices, especially when man-
agers' interests are threatened. For example, for the 
purpose of manipulating share prices, managers of 
buyout firms have an incentive to 'understate' in-
come through controlling the changes in revenues 
and depreciable capital, while managers of firms 
about to make an initial public offering have an 
incentive to 'overstate' income by exercising discre-
tion in depreciation policies and bad debt allow-
ances (Aflatooni & Nikbakht 2009; Stolowy & Bar-
tov 2004). 
Indeed, firms are known to change accounting 
estimates and accounting methods when they are 
close to debt covenant violation. Even firms that 
have violated debt covenants implement income-
increasing accounting changes to improve their 
bargaining power for future renegotiation. In addi-
tion to these incentives for managers to engage in 
income smoothing practices, academic research 
finds that there are motivations for managers to 
circumvent regulatory requirements. For instance, 
banks are likely to overstate loan loss provisions 
and understate loan write-offs when they are close 
to the minimum capital requirement threshold. 
Having an incentive to obtain more benefits from 
import relief, firms may understate income during 
import relief investigation (Herman & Inoue 1996; 
Heflin et al. 2002; Tan & Jamal 2006) 
The financial statements, including the com-
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parative information for prior periods, are pre-
sented as if the new accounting policy had always 
been in use. Therefore, comparative information is 
restated in order to reflect the new accounting pol-
icy. The amount of the adjustment relating to peri-
ods prior to those included in the financial state-
ments is adjusted against the opening balance of 
retained earnings of the earliest period presented. 
Any other information with respect to prior peri-
ods, such as historical summaries of financial data, 
is also restated (PSAK 25, paragraph 46). When a 
change in an accounting policy has a material effect 
on the current period or any prior period pre-
sented, or it may have a material effect in subse-
quent periods, an enterprise should disclose the 
following (PSAK 25, paragraph 49) : 
1. the reasons for the change; 
2. the amount of the adjustment for the current 
period and for each period presented; 
3. the amount of the adjustment relating to peri-
ods prior to those included in the comparative 
information; and 
4. the fact that comparative information has been 
restated or that it is impracticable to do so. 
Moreover, accounting policy changes have 
been widely used to identify income smoothing in 
previous studies. The discretionary accounting 
changes was selected as smoothing instruments 
because they can give a material impact on re-
ported earnings and are unlikely to be adopted 
without management consideration of the effects 
(Atik 2009; DeAngelo et al. 1994). According to the 
Indonesian Financial Accounting Standards 
(PSAK 25, paragraph 6), accounting policies are 
the specific principles, bases, conventions, rules 
and practices adopted by an enterprise in prepar-
ing and presenting financial statements. Users 
need to be able to compare the financial state-
ments or enterprise over a period of time to iden-
tify trends in its financial positions, performance 
and cash flows. Therefore, the same accounting 
policies are normally adopted in each period. A 
change in accounting policy should be made only 
if required by the company’s statute, or by an ac-
counting standard setting body or if change will 
result in a more appropriate presentation of events 
or transactions in the financial statements of the 
enterprise. 
 
Hypothesis Development 
In this study, the discretionary accounting change 
is selected as a smoothing device for several rea-
sons. First, accounting policy changes can have a 
material impact on reported income and, conse-
quently, are unlikely to be adopted without man-
agement consideration of the effects. Second, no 
assumption needs to be made concerning the mag-
nitude of the discretionary component of an ac-
counting change. In addition, findings in smooth-
ing practices can be sensitive to the way the discre-
tionary component is isolated. Accounting changes, 
however, provide a measure that is purely discre-
tionary (Tan & Jamal 2006; DeAngelo et al. 1994; 
Callen et al. 2008). Accordingly, the hypothesis is 
stated as follows: 
H1: There is a significant relationship between the 
discretionary accounting changes and the level of 
income smoothing practices by Indonesian listed 
firms 
 
Institutional Ownership 
Institutional investor provides strong incentives 
for institutions to actively monitor and influence 
management actions. Their various policy deci-
sions and institutional investors are also generally 
expected to be able to use current information to 
predict future earnings better than non-
institutional investors. A study on institutional 
monitoring and opportunistic earnings manage-
ment by Mansor and Achmad (2009) finds evi-
dence that the presence of large institutional 
shareholdings inhibit managers from managing 
accruals to achieve desired level of income. Their 
results show that when managers have incentives 
to increase or decrease reported income as re-
vealed from the cash-flow performance for current 
versus future periods, they accomplish the objec-
tive by using income-increasing or income-
decreasing discretionary accruals to maintain a 
desired earnings stream. Koh (2005) and Siregar 
and Utama (2008) suggest that with the increase in 
shareholdings in a particular firm, institutional 
investors have strong incentives to monitor man-
agement to increase firm value by focusing more 
on long-term profitability instead of managing 
income on a year-by-year basis. Accordingly, the 
hypothesis is stated as follows: 
H2: There is a significant relationship between the 
IS practices and the institutional ownership in the 
company. 
 
External Audit Quality 
Several studies have examined the association 
between external auditor quality and earnings 
management. Research evidence suggests that the 
large audit firms are perceived to perform a 
higher audit quality than smaller audit firms. The 
type of auditors is selected as an explanatory vari-
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able to determine whether the magnitude of IS 
practices is an effect of the type of auditors. The 
types of external auditors are categorized into 
groups; the “Big four” firms (Deloitte Touche 
Tohmatsu, KPMG, Ernst & Young, and Price 
Waterhouse Cooper) and “non- Big- four ” firms 
(other than the big four firm). The “Big four”, 
which operate throughout the world with high 
reputation, are expected to be unlikely involved in 
and associated with income smoothing practices. 
On the other hand, the “non-Big four” firms are 
hypothesized to be as less reputable and lower 
prestige is expected to have more tolerance with 
their clients (Kanagaretman et al. 2010; Kim et al. 
2003; Krishnan 2003). External auditors’ size is 
used to measure external audit quality, where one 
for firms audited by Big 4 auditors (high audit 
quality) and zero for firms audited by non-Big 4 
auditors (low audit quality). Accordingly, the hy-
pothesis is as follows: 
H3: There is a significant relationship between the 
IS practices and the quality of external audit firms. 
 
Type of Industry 
Ashari et al. (1994) conclude that companies in 
different industries smooth their income in vary-
ing degrees. It appears that companies in certain 
industries (for example, industrial sectors are de-
fined as peripheral industrial sectors by some re-
searchers) face a more restricted opportunity 
structure and a higher degree of environmental 
uncertainty. It can be noted that the hotel, prop-
erty and services sector in Indonesia is highly 
competitive and is very reactive to national eco-
nomic and political events. Based on such argu-
ment, the hotel/properties, trading and services 
have an incentive for firm to smooth its reported 
income compared to other industry sectors. For 
this study, industrial sectors are categorized into 
industrial or manufacturing in line with classifica-
tions used by the Indonesia Stock Exchange. 
Therefore, the association between income-
smoothing behavior of the sample companies and 
the industrial type is positively related. Two 
dummy variables are used to capture the indus-
trial or manufacturing sectors. The first dummy 
variable is used to categorize companies into the 
manufacturing type (1) and the others (0) for ho-
tel/properties, trading, services and others. Ac-
cordingly, the relevant hypothesis is as follows: 
H4: There is a significant relationship between the 
IS practices and the type of industrial sector of the 
company. 
 
3. RESEARCH METHOD 
The research methodology of this study is based 
on the study of Moses (1987) and Atik (2009) be-
cause it is the most applicable method for the data 
provided by Indonesia listed companies and there 
is no need to make estimations about the discre-
tionary and non-discretionary parts of smoothing 
instruments. Moses (1987) and Atik (2009) accepts 
discretionary accounting changes (DACs) as in-
come-smoothing instruments and thinks that 
firms try to smooth their income figures by using 
DACs. A discretionary accounting change can 
have a big impact on the reported income and 
cannot be done without management’s discretion. 
It is impossible to know real intents of managers 
therefore Atik (2009) assumes income smoothing 
to be one of the possible motivations of DACs 
rather than assuming the purpose of DACs is al-
ways income smoothing. 
According to Moses (1987) and Atik (2009), 
smoothing was measured as the degree to which an 
accounting change shifts income toward expected 
income (EE). For each sample firm, the income 
number that would be reported had the firm that 
did not adopt the accounting change. This was de-
termined and termed pre-change income (PE). A 
measure of smoothing behavior (SB) was calculated 
by comparing the deviations of pre change and 
reported income (RE) from expectations. Therefore 
PE, RE, and EE are all un-deflated measures and 
consequently dependent on firm sales was used 
here as a deflator. Based on this model income 
smoothing is measured as the degree to which an 
accounting change shifts income toward expected 
Figure 1 
The Sample Selection 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Firms with 
complete data 
doing discretionary 
accounting changes 
(DAC) 
Test: 
Smoothing 
Behavior Index 
by Moses 
(1987) Positive= Smoother 
firms 
Negative= Non-
smoother firms 
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income (EE). The calculation of pre-change income 
(PE) is the income number that would have been 
reported had the firm not adopted the accounting 
policy change. 
SALES
EEREEEPE
SB
−−−= . (1) 
Where: 
SB = the smoothing behavior,  
PE = the pre-change earnings,  
EE = the expected earnings, 
RE = the reported earnings. 
A measure of smoothing behavior is calcu-
lated by comparing the deviations of pre-change 
and reported income from expectations. Since PE, 
RE, and EE are all un-deflated measures and con-
sequently dependent on sales are used here as a 
deflator. A simple random walk model (SRWM), 
predicting income in any year as equal to reported 
income in the previous year, is used for the tests in 
this study. It is because the expected incomes de-
pend solely on the most currently observed in-
come (Atik 2009; Mohamad 2001). In this model, it 
is assumed that the management making discre-
tionary accounting changes to keep the current 
year’s income level at least equal to the last year. 
Smoother and non-smoother firms are distin-
guished by the sign of the amount that is gener-
ated by the application of the above formula. Posi-
tive values of SB mean the analyzed firm is an 
income smoother. Figure 1 shows the diagram of 
the sample selection. 
 
Analysis to Determine the Direct Smoothing In-
strument 
The smoothing instruments are the variables used 
by managers in attempting to smooth particular 
accounting figures. According to Moses (1987) and 
Callen et al. (2008), an accounting practice or meas-
urement rule must possess certain properties before 
it is used as a manipulative smoothing instrument. 
Therefore, for this research, the observations on the 
notes of financial statements refer to the changes in 
accounting policies. 
Changes in Accounting Policies 
Accounting policy changes have been widely used 
to identify income smoothing in previous studies. 
The discretionary accounting changes was selected 
as smoothing instruments because they can give a 
material impact on reported income and are 
unlikely to be adopted without management con-
sideration of the effects (Atik 2009; Mohammad 
2001; Herman & Inoue 1996). 
According to the Indonesian Financial Ac-
counting Standards (PSAK 25, paragraph 6), ac-
counting policies are the specific principles, bases, 
conventions, rules and practices adopted by an 
enterprise in preparing and presenting financial 
statements. Users need to be able to compare the 
financial statements or enterprise over a period of 
time to identify trends in its financial positions, 
performance and cash flows. Therefore, the same 
accounting policies are normally adopted in each 
period. A change in accounting policy should be 
made only if required by the company’s statute, or 
by an accounting standard setting body or if 
change will result in a more appropriate presenta-
tion of events or transactions in the financial state-
ments of the enterprise. Table 1 lists the type of 
DAC. 
 
Source of Data, Sample Selection, and Statistical 
Method 
The population of interest selected for this study 
comprised firms listed on the Indonesia Stock Ex-
change and the DataStream database were used for 
the period of 2009 up to 2012. Refer to Stolowy and 
Bartov (2004) the term smoothing implies adjust-
ments to income smoothing in two or more con-
secutive periods and it required analysis of data for 
at least four periods. The results of some studies 
suggest that an increase in the time period tends to 
reduce errors of misclassification of firms as 
smoothers and non-smoothers therefore this study 
has employed a four year series data collections 
(Atik 2009; Mohamad 2001). 
The method of data analysis used is quantita-
Table 1 
Discretionary Accounting Policies Changes 
Description 
Change in method/estimate of depreciation, amortization, capitalization policies: goodwill, foreign exchange, 
borrowing cost, plantation expenses, reclassification of fixed assets and others 
Change in deferred taxation method 
Change in inventory method  
Change in income recognition method 
Sources: Adapted and revised from PSAK 25; Moses 1987 & Muhammad 2001. 
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tive method, the sampling method is purposive 
sampling and the independent t-test was used to 
analyze the data. Each sample should have a com-
plete financial annual report for each period ob-
served. Then, the occurrence of discretionary ac-
counting changes were scrutinized from the notes 
of financial reports and audit reports. These com-
panies were then tested using the smoothing be-
havior model. After the test of the smoothing be-
havior model the researcher expected to get the 
result of the smoothers and non-smoothers for each 
year. T-Test was applied in order to find out 
whether significant differences between smoother 
and non-smoother firms exist according to each of 
the explanatory variables. Because the classification 
of smoother and non-smoother firms changed ac-
cording to the model used to estimate expected 
earnings, t-test were applied for each smoothers 
and non-smoothers pair. Like Moses (1987) and 
Atik (2009), 90 percent confidence level has been 
selected. It predicted the direction of association 
between the variables and smoothing behavior, so 
they used one-tailed significance results to make 
evaluations. However, hypotheses of this study do 
not indicate the expected direction of the associa-
tion and therefore two-tailed significance results 
were used. 
 
4. DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
The observation on the notes of the financial re-
ports and auditor reports of the firms were made 
to find out the consistency of the selection of ac-
counting methods. These observations were made 
on financial reports to determine the tendency of 
using DAC. After going through the annual audit 
reports, the nature of the DAC was subsequently 
classified into four major categories according to 
their types as shown in Table 2. As seen in Table 2, 
managers mostly preferred to change their capi-
talization and/or expense policies, and then to 
change income recognition method. The third 
most prevalent DAC type is change in inventory 
valuation methods. From the sample of firms do-
ing DAC selected in this stage, the researcher cal-
culated an expected income number that the firms 
would use to smooth their income. Expected in-
come is used as a reference point from which 
measures of the deviation of actual income can be 
developed (Atik 2009; Mohamad 2001). Positive 
values of smoothing behavior (SB) mean that the 
analyzed firm is an income smoother. By using a 
smoothing behavior index, firms were categorized 
as smoothers and non-smoothers. Table 3 shows 
the number of smoother and non-smoother firms 
that were determined according to simple random 
walk model (SRWM) model. 
In order to find out whether significant differ-
ences between smoother and non-smoother firms 
exist according to each of the explanatory variables, 
independent Sample t-test were applied (Atik 2008; 
Mohamad 2001). Because the classification of 
smoother and non-smoother firms changed accord-
ing to the each of the explanatory variables, t-test 
was applied for each smoothers and non-smoothers 
for 5 years. Like Moses (1987), 95 percent confi-
dence level has been selected. 
Table 2 
Firms Doing Discretionary Accounting (DAC) Changes by Year 
Description 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Change in method/estimate of depreciation, amortization, capitalization 
policies: goodwill, foreign exchange, borrowing cost, plantation expenses, 
reclassification of fixed assets and others 
 
 
35 
 
 
30 
 
 
24 
 
 
19 
Change in deferred taxation method 6 4 5 1 
Change in inventory method 8 3 6 4 
Change in income recognition method 11 10 4 5 
Total firms doing DAC 60 47 39 29 
Source: Research Data.  
 
Table 3 
Smoother and Non-smoother Firms According to SRWM Model 
Year Total firms doing DAC Smoother Percent Non-Smoother Percent 
2009 60 41 68% 19 32% 
2010 47 31 66% 16 34% 
2011 39 23 59% 16 41% 
2012 29 12 41% 17 59% 
Source: Research Data.  
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For independent sample t-test, if the variances 
are equal in both groups, then the p-value ("Sig.") 
will be greater than 0.05. However, if the p-value is 
less than 0.05, then the variances are unequal (Elliot 
& Woodward 2007). In this case, all the results have 
p-value greater than 0.05 for Levene's test, so re-
searcher can conclude that the results are equal 
variances and researcher looks at the Equal vari-
ances assumed column result. Looking down this 
column from the result we can see that the group 
means are significantly different as the value in the 
"Sig. (2-tailed)". 
 
Institutional Ownership and IS Practices 
The relationship of institutional ownership and IS 
practice was hypothesized in this study as H2: 
There are no significant relationship between the 
IS practices and the institutional ownership in the 
company. Appendices present the result of the 
logistic regression for the effect of institutional 
ownership to IS practices. Institutional ownership 
had no significant effect for 4 years at α = 0.1, p = 
0.257 in 2009, p= 0.132 in 2010, but in 2011 have 
relationship (α ≤ 0.1) with p = 0.082 and also in 
2012 has significant relationship at p=0.093. The 
explanation was that for Indonesia not much large 
investors were interested in investing their funds 
in Indonesian listed firms due to the politic situa-
tion that will affect the economic and company 
performance. This research conclude that, when 
institutional investors have relatively low share-
holdings in a company, there is less incentive for 
them to monitor managerial opportunism and 
they tend to be short- term oriented in their in-
vestment decision. 
 
External Audit Quality and IS Practices 
The primary purpose of the external audit func-
tion is to give opinion and obtain reasonable as-
surance that financial statements are free of mate-
rial misstatement. This study aims to test if the 
external audit has a significant effect on the prac-
tice of IS. Therefore, as stated in hypothesis H3, it 
is hypothesized that there is a significant relation-
ship between the IS practices and the quality of 
external audit firms. The logistic regression results 
in Appendices show that external audit quality 
has no significant relationship (α ≤ 0.1) with IS 
practices for two periods, during 2009 at p = 0.107, 
but it has higher significant relationship (α ≤ 0.1) 
at p=0.064 in 2010 and have significant relation-
ship in 2011 at p=0.051 and in 2012 with p = 0.048. 
For the Indonesia case, the empirical evidence on 
external audit quality measures has been mixed.  
Research by Fan and Wong (2005), Francis et 
al. (2004) state that the quality of the external 
auditor’s performance is multi-dimensional as set 
forth in the auditing standards and also in the 
differences auditor capabilities. Therefore, audit 
quality differences result in variation of the credi-
bility offered by the external auditors, and exter-
nal auditors cannot obtain absolute assurance that 
the financial statements are free from misstate-
ments (Krishnan 2003). 
In 2011 and 2012, there is a relationship be-
tween the IS practices and the quality of external 
audit firms. The possible explanation is that after 
the long financial crisis period the economy was 
more stable and this created a major challenge for 
managers and external audit seeking to maintain 
investors’ confidence in companies’ performance. 
Therefore, research finding shows that high qual-
ity external audit can constrain income smoothing 
practices and can provide more precise financial 
information. It means that external audit influ-
ences in enhancing the credibility of financial re-
porting quality as shown by the reduction of IS 
practices. 
 
Type of Industry and IS Practices 
Some research concluded that companies in differ-
ent industries smoothed their income in varying 
degrees. It appears that companies in certain indus-
tries (for example, hotel, real estate and service in-
dustries) face a higher degree of environmental 
uncertainty and such companies have more oppor-
tunity to smooth their income. As shown in H4, this 
study hypothesizes that there is a significant rela-
tionship between the IS practices and the type of 
industrial sector of the company. Appendices 
shows that in all the four periods the type of indus-
try has no significant relationship with the behavior 
of IS practices p= 0.407 in 2009, p= 0.201 in 2010, p= 
0.167 in 2011 and p= 0.102 in 2012 .The explanation 
is that for Indonesian listed firm, the IS practices do 
not depend to the type of industry but do on firm’s 
performance and income smoothing practices are 
more likely to be present when a firm’s perform-
ance is usually bad or in loss condition. 
 
5. CONCLUSION, IMPLICATION, SUGGES-
TION AND LIMITATIONS 
In general, it can be concluded that the highest per-
centage of using DAC (69%) is in 2009, and the 
lowest of DAC (41%) in 2012. Accordingly, it can 
also be asserted that Indonesian listed firms tend to 
use DAC as income smoothing instrument to 
smooth their income. In addition, external audit 
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quality and institutional ownership have positive 
significant influence towards IS practices. 
The limitation in this study is that this fo-
cuses only on publicly listed companies in Indo-
nesia, as an emerging capital market. Therefore, 
the findings reported in this study might not be 
generalizable to other firms in other countries 
with different economic and business settings. 
For future research, the research can develop and 
combine a better IS practice model. It can de-
velop a particular model for local or foreign in-
vestor, probably with different institutional own-
ership characteristics, the influence of IS instru-
ments to company income that might produce 
different result. 
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APPENDICES 
 
 
Independent Sample t-Test 
 Levene’s Test for 
Equality of 
variance 
 
t-test for the Equality of Means 
95% Confidence 
interval of the 
difference 
Equal variances 
assumed F Sig. T  Sig. (2tailed) Mean Diff. 
Std. Error 
difference Lower Upper 
          
2009          
Institutional 
Ownership 
8.282 0.310 2.894  0.257 1.23489 0.4219851 0.37843 2.58754 
External Audit 
Quality 
5.282 0.420 2.433  0.107 1.18239 0.200131 0.30232 2.72350 
Type of industry 2.428 0.534 2.454  0.407 2.00752 0.326732 0.09828 3.32923 
    
2010    
Institutional 
Ownership 
3.532 0.514 2.219  0.132 1.08659 0.408861 0.134843 4.098754 
External Audit 
Quality 
4.042 0.218 3.109  0.064* 1.39707 0.804781 0.108873 3.054904 
Type of industry 6.354 0.385 2.033  0.201 1.46812 0.504086 0.209873 2.764005 
          
2011          
Institutional 
Ownership 
5.903 0.447 2.210  0.082* 1.22112 0.400242 0.220981 2.30803 
External Audit 
Quality 
4.121 0.218 3.027  0.051* 3.08041 0.782098 0.090052 1.343027 
Type of industry 2.291 0.138 3.012  0.167 2.03492 0.981001 0.19234 1.04527 
          
2012          
Institutional 
Ownership 
3.459 0.253 2.281  0.093* 1.23489 0.4219851 0.37843 2.15754 
External Audit 
Quality 
6.083 0.356 2.092  0.048** 0.20083 0.3823401 0.90374 2.50870 
Type of industry 8.082 0.134 2.398  0.102 1.02752 0.5267032 0.09828 2.90623 
Notes: The table indicated significance at 0.01 (***), 0.05(**) and 0.1(*) levels 
Source: Research data.  
